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CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PERSONS.
MODERN authorities profess to leave unquestioned the rule that
only those can bring suit upon a contract who are parties to it.
Where, however, the rights of third persons are involved, cases are
numerous in which the strict application of the rule would work injustice. If I make a promise to another, the consideration for which is a
matter concerning no one else, but which may incidentally benefit a
third person, should he thereby acquire a right to sue me for its
breach ? If so, must I also remain liable to the promisee, and be subject to the inconvenience-if to nothing else-of two separate actions
at the same time for the same debt ? On the other hand, if I remit
money to another with a request that he pay it over to a third person in satisfaction of my debt to that third person, and the recipient promises upon sufficient consideration to do so, should not he
for whose benefit the promise was made, be entitled to recover the
amount? Is the promisor anything more or less than a trustee?
A maintenance of the rule in its full force, in spite of the occasional hardship upon third persons, would have been far more satisfactory than the present state of the law. But the admission of a
single exception formed an entering wedge which materially weakened the power of the rule, and has resulted in a deplorable conflict
of reasoning and decision in the authorities. An attempt to reconcile these, or even to explain them, would be a useless task. There
is, however, a certain grouping of the cases possible, depending for
classification more upon the facts involved than upon the grounds
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of the decisions, which will serve to illustrate the law of the
subject.
In Dutton v. Poole, 1 Vent. 318, s. c. 2 Lev. 210, which, though
not the earliest, was long the leading case on the point in England,
it was held that a daughter, who was privy neither to the contract
nor to the consideration, might maintain an action on a promise
made to her father for her benefit. The explanation commonly
given bases the decision upon the near relationship of the third
person to the promisee, although others have been suggested. This
case was frequently affirmed until Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 B. & S.
392, overruled it and established the existing law. Although it
would be inaccurate to say that the English cases admit of no exceptions to the rule already" mentioned, the exceptions are surrounded by careful restrictions, and there is a strong disposition to
adhere strictly to the rule: Dicey on Parties (ed. 1876) p. 81;
Smart v. Chell, 7 Dowl. 785 ; Lilly v. Hays, 5 A. & E. 548 ; Noble
v. National Discount Co., 29 L. J. 210 (Ex.) 5 H. & N. 225;
Howell v. Batt, 5 B. & Ad. 506. In the United States, on the
other hand, Dutton v. Poole would be sustained by the weight of
authority; not on account of the relationship, but because the benefit to the daughter was the principal object of the contract: Meech
v. Ensign, 21 Am. L. R. 608 ; Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432 ;
Hendrick v. Lindsay, 93 U. S. 143: Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y.
280; Felton v. Dickinson, 10 Mass. 287.
In fact, so far have some American courts gone in opposition to
the Ehglish view that it has been held possible for one not a party
to the contract to sue-upon it although under seal: Coster v. Mayor,
1; Bassett v.
43 N.Y. 399; McDowell v. Laev, 35 Wis.
Hughes, 43 Id. 319 ; Rogers v. Gosnell, 51 Mo. 466; Garvin v.
Mobley, 1 Bush 48; Huckabee v. May, 14 Ala. 263.
In Pennsylvania and several New England states, where, although
the cases are conflicting, there is no disposition to receive the exceptions in their unqualified form, it is acknowledged that if the
promisor receive money from the promisee to be delivered to the
third person, the latter may maintain an action : Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts 182; Mellen v. Whiple, 1 Gray 317. Nor is the
right of the third person to sue denied where the contract has
for its object a benefit to him, and is made with that intent:
Meech v. Ensign, supra. In most of the states, however, the broad
principle, unrestricted and unqualified, is laid down that a plain-

CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PERSONS.

3

tiff may bring suit on a simple contract to which he is not a
party, when it cohtains a provision for his benefit: Wharton on
Contracts (ed. 1882) sect. 787.
No doubt this question of the rights of third persons in such
contracts is a difficult and doubtful one. Perhaps that fact explains the cbnflict of authority; it certainly demands for each of
these cases careful and thorough consideration.
Whatever the
apparent presumption of such a remark, it is believed that many
of them have been too hastily decided and many of the opinions too carelessly worded. It is hardly too much to say that
authority may be found for almost any view of a given state of
facts which counsel or the court may prefer to adopt. The object
of this article will therefore be to classify the cases under headings
which contain conservative statements of what the weight of authority seems to have settled.
WHERE THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTr OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
THE PROMISOR AND THE PROMISEE IS A BENEFIT TO THE THIRD
PERSON HE MAY SUE UPON IT.

The difficulty of determining what is the principalobject of such
contracts is at once apparent. It is only a reasonable presumption
that the benefit to himself was the ruling motive in the mind of
the promisor, and formed the consideration for the promise. But
this nded not always be true; the benefit to the promisor may be
an unimportant factor in the agreement, or may arise so indirectly
that it scarcely appears. Thus in Felton v. Dickinson, 10 Mass.
287, the promisee placed his son in the service of the promisor
upon an agreement that at the end of the term of seriice the
promisor would pay to the son a certain sum of money, and it was
held that the son might recover according to the terms of the agreement. But in Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268, the promisee owed to
the third person $300. The promisor borrowed the same amount
from the promisee and agreed to pay it over to the third person in
satisfaction of the original debt. The latter was held entitled to
recover.
As sustaining the above proposition generally, see Hind v. Holdship, 2 Watts 104; Vincent v. Watson, 6 Harris 96; Edmundson
v. Penny, 1 Barr 834; Wynn v. Wood, 1 Outerbridge 216;
Beers v. Robinson, 9 Barr 229; Esling v. Zantzinger, 1 Harris
50; Comm. Bk. v. Wood, 7 W. & S. 89; Guthrie v. Kerr, 4
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Norris 303; .ountz v. Holthouse, Id. 235; Both v. Barner,
12 Weekly Notes of Cases 523; D. & H. Canal Co. v. Bk., 4
Denio 97; Simson v. Brown, 68 N. Y. 355; Farley v. Cleveland,
4 Cow. 432; 9 Id. 639; Cumberland v. Codrington, 3 Johns. Ch.
254; Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Denio 45; _Pelton v. Dickinson, 10
Mass. 287; Frost v. Gage, 1 Allen 262; Carnegie v. Morrison,
2 Met. 381; Hincey v. Fowler, 15 Me. 285; Motley v. Ins. Co.,
29 Id. 337; Bohanan v. Pope, 42 Id. 93; .Railroad Co. v. Cole.,
24 Vt. 33; Crocker v. Higgins, 7 Conn. 347; Steene v. Aylesworth, 18 Id. 244; Clapp v. Lawton, 31 Id. 95; Thompson v.
Thompson, 4 Ohio St. 353; Putney v. Farnham, 27 Wis. 187;
.Kollock v. Parcher, 52 Id. 393; Davis v. Calloway, 30 Ind. 112;
Carter v. Zenblin, 68 Id. 436; Fisher v. Wilmoth, Id. 449; Association v. Magnier, 16 La. Ann. 338; Carver v. Bads, 65 Ala.
190; Lucas v. Chamberlain,8 B. Monroe 276; Bett v. McLaughlin, 12 Mo. 433; Corl v. Biggs, Id. 430; Smith v. Mayberry, 13
Nevada 427; Green v. Richardson, 4 Colorado 581.
In those states, however, in which the rule is strictly construed,
it is held that the interest of the third person must be exclusive to
entitle him to recover. In Blymire v. Boistle, 6 Watts 182,
SERGEANT, J., makes the distinction clear: "Where one person
contracts with another to pay money to a third or to deliver over
some valuable thing, and such third person is thus the only party
in interest, he ought to possess the right to release the demand or
recover it by action. But when a debt already exists from one
person to another, a promise by a third person to pay such debt,
being for the benefit of the original debtor, and to relieve him from
the payment of it, he ought to have a right of action against the
promisor for his own indemnity; and if the promisor were also
liable to the original creditor, he would be subject to two separate
actions at the same time, for the same debt, which would be inconIn the one instance the
venient and might lead to injustice."
promisor becomes the custodian and trustee of a fund actually
belonging to the beneficiary. In the other he undertakes to pay
some sum or do some act, in consideration of a benefit conferred
on himself. In Pennsylvania the distinction as thus stated, in
spite of conflict, has been kept in view. Cummings v. .Klapp, 5
W. & S. 511; Ramsdale v. Horton, 3 Barr 330; Finney v. Finney, 4 Harris 380; Campbell v. Lacock, 4 Wright 448; Morrison
v. Beckey, 6 Watts 349; Robertson v. Reed, 11 Wright 115;
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Torrens v. Campbell, 24 P. F. Smith 470; a-uthrie v. Kerr, 4
Norris 303; -Miss. C. Railroad Co. v. Southern _ailroad Association, 8 Phila. 107. It is also recognised in National Bank v.
Grand Lodge, 98 U. S- 123.'
AGENCY.-A

portion of the court in the case of Lawrence v.

Fox, supra, considered that the promise was to be regarded as
made to the third person through the medium of the promisor as
his agent, whose conduct he could ratify when it came to his
knowledge, though taken without his being privy thereto, and this
view has met with some favor in other cases. Treat v. Stanton, 14
Conn. 445; Meech v. Ensign, supra;Johnson v. Collins, 14 Iowa
63. To call upon the law of agency to supply a supposed deficiency
in the law of contracts affords no standing ground. It is said that
the promisor is the agent of the third person whose acts the latter
can ratify, whereas directly the reverse of this is true. The
promisor is the agent of the promisee, if of anybody. The assets
in his hands are the property of the promisee and subject to his
control; their loss would not fall upon the third person. , The contract may be resciiided and the third person cannot complain:
Davis v. Galloway, 30 Ind. 112. True, when the third person has
acted upon the promise the parties are bound: Bassett v. Hughes,
43 Wis. 319. But the reason for this will be discovered not in
the law of agency but that of contracts
SURETYSHIP.- Where the facts warrant an inference that the
promisee, by his contract with the promisor,became the surety of the
latter: Blyer v Monholland, 2 Sandf. Ch. 478; Curtis v. Tyler,
9 Paige 432; King v. Thitely, 10 Id. 465; Crawford Y. Edwards,
33 Mich. 354; Bishop v. -Douglass,25 Wis. 696; Klapworth v.
-Dressier,2 Beas. N. J. Ch. 62. The authorities are agreed that
this ground is only tenable in equity. Even here, however, the
effect is to make a contract for the parties different from that
which they intended. Certainly there is no express contract of
suretyship ;-contrary to-the fact, the court must assume a contract
created not by the acts of the parties, but by the operation of a
rule of law upon those acts. The promisor agrees with the promisee to pay the debt, and thereby, as between themselves, becomes
the principal debtor. But the promisee not being discharged is
also liable to the third person. If compelled to pay he is a surety
only in this, that he has a right to call upon the promisor to

6

CONTRACTS FOR THE BENEFIT OF THIRD PERSONS.

indemnify him. But all this does not affect the third person and he
is not a party to it. What interest has he in the transaction, and
in what consists his equity ? To make that relationship available
to him it is necessary not only to bring him into contract relations
with the other parties, but also to reverse the positions of the principal and surety and make the promisor the surety instead of the
principal. According to what rule of law can this be done ? By
what process of reasoning can it be vindicated ? This doctrine,
and the exception to the rule, cannot both stand. If the promisee
is a surety for the promisor, who has assumed payment of the
debt, then, failing to recover from the promisor, the third person
has a recourse over against the promisee who would thus be compelled to pay his debt twice. Furiher, the only reasonable
position which the exception to the rule can occupy is that
which would regard the bringing of suit by the third person
against the promisor as evidence of the former's assent to accept
the promisor as his debtor, and a consequent extinguishment of the
promisee's liability.
NOVATION.- Whfere, in the contract between them, the promisor
assumes the promisee's debt he becomes liable by substitution or

novation.
(a.) Cdnveyance of property subject to a -mortgage which is assumed by the grantee.
These cases rest upon the following argument: B. is indebted
to A. B. sells land to C., who agrees, instead of paying the price
in full, to assume the debt, or to become A.'s debtor in lieu of B.
If A. were present assbnting, the novation would be consummated
on the instant; but A., being absent, learns of the agreement afterward, and assents to it by bringing his action. Why may not the
novation be completed by the assent so given as effectually as if
given on the instant? If it be said that in order to create a privity between A. and C., the assent must be mutual, the answer is
that C. had already assented. and there was nothing wanting but
A.'s assent to perfect the novation. To reach such a conclusion
it is only necessary to make certain presumptions which are so appropriate to the nature of the transaction that the law can readily
allow them : Urquhart v. Brayton, 12 R. I. 169; Merriman v.
Moore, 9 Norris 78; Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y. 253;
Crowell v. Currier, 27 N. J. Eq. 152; Campbell v. Smith, 71
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N. Y. 26; Burr v. Beers, 24 Id. 178; Norwood v. DeHart, 30
N. J. Eq. 412; Crowell v. Hospital, 12 C. E. Green 650; Heim
v. Vogel, 69 Mo. 529; Pitzgerald v. Barker, 70 Id. 685; Day
v. Patterson, 18 Ind. 114; contra, Meech v. Ensign, 21 Am.
L. R. 608; King v. Whitely, 10 Paige 465; Trotter v. Hughes,
12 N. Y. 74; Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 Id. 233; _Page v. Becker,
31 Mo. 467. But it is the very making of these presumptions
which constitutes a strong objection to this class of cases. Three
essential elements of a novation are wanting: 1st. A contract drawn
up in accordance with the intention of the parties. Certainly to
give the mortgagee additional security was not their object; to thus
interpret it is to make a contract for them. 2d. The consent of
the mortgagee to accept the promisor as his debtor. 3d. The discharge of the original debtor.
(b) Where one of two partners assumes the payment of firm
debts as part of the consideration of a contract with the retiring
partner,firm creditors may not sue the obligors on the partner's
bond.
Here it is considered that there is no privity of contract between
the promisor and the creditors. The promise was not made to.
them nor for their use and benefit. No consideration moved from
the creditors nor wvas a trust fund created for their benefit : Shoemaker v. King, 4 Wright 107 ; Campbell v. Lacock, Id. 448; Torrens v. Campbell,24 P. F. Smith 470 ; M1errill v. Green, 55 N. Y.
270; Manny v. .rasierj 27 Mo. 419. But in Pennsylvania a distinction has been drawn between this case and that where the suit
is by the creditors of the old firm against the partners who continue
the business, in the latter case they may recover: Bellas v. Tagely,
7 Harris 273; Vincent v. Watson, 6 Id. 96 ; Campbell v. Lacock,
4 Wright 452; Wynn v. Wood, 1 Outerbridge 216. See also,
Devol v. Mcntosh, 23 Ind. 529; Lehow v. Simonton, 3 Col.
846.
TRUST FUND.- Where by the contract between the promisor and
the promisee, the former becomes a trusteefor the thirdperson.
There seem to be very good reasons for allowing a recovery by
the third person in such cases. It must be remembered that the
action is not brought upon the express promise which passes between the contracting parties, but upon an implied promise to the
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third person from the promisor.

The promisor then has become

the possessor of assets which in equity and good conscience belong
to the third person; the right of the latter is undoubted, and certainly none exists in the former. Why then should there be no
recovery? The law supplies the want of privity by the fiction of
an implied promise, and adjusts the rights of the parties according to a standard which by their own acts they have adopted:
Pleming v. Alter, 7 S. & R. 295 ; Justice v. Tallman, 5 Norris
147 ; Fitch v. Chandler, 4 Cush. 254 ; Arnold v. Lyman, 17 Mass.
400; Ball v. Marston, Id. 575; Putnam v. Field, 108 Id. 556;
Sailly v. Cleveland, 10 Wend. 156; . tna Bank v. Fourth Nat.
Bank, 46 N. Y. 82; .Draughan v. Bunting, 9 Ired. 10; Brown
v. O'Brien, 1 Rich. (S. C.) 268; 6oss v. Truesdale, 28 Ind.
44; -Donkersleyv. Levy, 38 Mich. 55. On the other hand it is
urged that the mere .delivery of money to the promisor who agrees
to pay it to a third person does not constitute an agreement to pay
to the third person within -any definition of that term. The promisor derives no benefit from the receipt of the money which still
remains the property of the promisee.
Should it be lost without
the fault of the promisor, the loss falls upon the promisee, not
upon the third person. The debt of the promisee is not extinguished by a delivery to the promisor and the latter is in no sense
the agent of the third person. lie receives the money as the agent
of the promisee, who may at any time recall it and divert it to
another use: Biqelow v. -Davis, 16 Barb. 561; Warren v. Batchelder, 15 N. H. 129.
Where the circumstances warrantan inference eithera. That the third person accepts the promisor as his trustee; or,
b. That a bargain, more or less direct, has been entered into
between the third person and the promisor.
In Brewer v. Dyer, 7 Cush. 337, A. leased property to B.
Before the lease had expired 0., with the knowledge of A., agreed
with B. that he would take the premises and pay rent, &c., to A.
A. sued 0. in assumpsit, and it was held that the agreement given
by C. to B. did not amount to a legal assignment of the lease, but
that A. was entitled to recover the rent, for the remainder of the
term, from C., as being a promise made to B. for A.'s benefit: see,
also, Mellen v. Whipple, 1 Gray 317. In Wyman v. Smith, 2
Sandf. 331, A. sent money to B., with instructions that he pay it
to C. C. called upon B., who promised to pay it to C.' 0. was
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held entitled to recover from B.: Todd v. Tobey, 29 Maine 219;
Grover v. 5'iT8, 5 Black 498; Weston v. Barker, 12 Johns. (N.
Y.) 276; Krentz v. Livingston, 15 Cal. 345.
Where the promisor as part of the considerationof a contract
of sale assumes a debt of the promisee to a third person.
In Huckabee v..May, 14 Alabama 263, A. was indebted to B.
in the sum of $4000, and to C. in the sum of $400. A. executed
and delir-red to B. a deed conveying land and negroes by which
B. covenanted in consideration therefor, to release his own debt
and to pay A.'s debt to C. and those to various other parties. C.
sued B. in assumpsit and was allowed to recover. The court proceeded upon the ground that the weight of authority allowed the
recovery by a third person on a promise to pay a sum of money
made for his benefit when the contract wa, by parol. Had the
conveyance been of a sum of money under similar conditions the
third person might have recovered in an action for money had and
received. The acceptance of the property was not an agreement
on the part of the promisor to sell it as a trustee for that purpose,
but an admission that he had the money to pay the creditors of the
promisee. In other words, by the terms of the contract the land
was to be regarded as money, and the authorities show that where
the consideration is treated by the parties as money an action for
money had and received will lie: Ainslie v. Wilson, 7 Cowen 662;
Pinckhardv. Banks, 13 East 20. The property was not charged
with the payment of the debts, but the promisor stipulated to pay
them. The very decree that a court of equity would render, would
be an agreement in favor of sustaining the action at law. It could not
be to subject the property to sale, as a trust fund, but would simply be
that the promisor should pay to the third person a sum of money,
because in equity and good conscience he owed it to him. As the
parties had treated the sum as money due the third person from the
promisor the former might recover at law. Most of the cases,
however, prefer to regard the promisor as a trustee, and the debt,
payment of which he has assumed, as a part of the purchase-money,
and this would seem to be the better view. Ellwood v. Monk, 5
Wendell 235; Snell v. Ives, 85 Ill. 279; Beasley v. Webster, 64
Id. 458; Sanders v. Glason, 13 Minn. 379; Jordan v. White, 20
Id. 91; Welsh v. Railroad Co., 25 Id. 314; Bassett v. flughes,
43 Wis. 319; Morgan v. Overman. S. M. Co., 37 Cal. 536;
VOL. XXXL-2
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-Johnso, v. Collins, 14 Iowa 63; Joslfn v. . J. Car-spring Co.,
7 Yroom 141. On the other hand it is not to be denied that to
entitle a third person to recover there must be an extinguishment
of the original debt. What can operate as such an extinguishment
except payment, or, what is equivalent to it, the agreement of
the creditor to accept the promisor as his debtor? In most of the
cases the only evidence of the creditor's acceptance is the bringing
of his suit, and in some this is held not to be sufficient. McLaren
v. -Hutchinson, 18 Cal. 82; Butterfield v. JHart8horn, 7 N.
H. 245.
The want of harmony in the reasoning of the authorities is an
element of weakness. But the differelice is more apparent than
real; it lies rather in the grounds for the conclusion than in the
conclusion itself. One may be excused a feeling of surprise that
two judges who had parted company after their statements of fact
should meet again upon the decree. The frequent repetition of
this phenomenon indicates that there is here some underlying
principle, but there is little to aid in its discovery. An examination of the cases will show that in the majority of them when the
contract was founded upon good consideration one of two results
followed. The promisor assumed the payment-of another's debt,
or became the possessor of another's assets. But while this is sufficiently evident, circumstances may make it difficult to determine
in a given case which of these results follow. For example, the
cases which have been classed under the headings Novation and
Trust Eund, embrace, in the main, three states of facts: 1. A
conveyance of land subject to a mortgage which is assumed by the
grantee; 2. A transfer of partnership assets from an old to a new
firm, with an assumption on the part of the latter of the debts of
the former; 3. An assumption by the vendee of a debt of the
vendor to a third person, as part of the consideration of a contract
of sale. It then becomes a nice question to determine whether the
promisor has assumed a debt, merely, or whether the debt, being
made part of the purchase-money, may not be considered assets in
his hands. This distinction is an important one in such states as
Pennsylvania, where the promise to pay another's debt cannot be
enforced by a third person when the promise is for the benefit of
the original debtor (the promisee): Blymire v. Boistle, supra. An
application of the test laid down by SERGEANT, J. (ante), yields no
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satisfactory results, for this state of facts seems clearly distinguishable from any ordinary promise to pay another's debt. While it
may be acknowledged, in accordance with many able opinions, that
if B. promises A. to pay A.'s debt to 0. without more, the latter
cannot recover, it does not follow under the authorities, that when
B. purchases from A., and instead of paying the purchase-money
in fall, assumes a debt to 0. which is thus made part of the consideration, C.'s recovery is barred because B.'s promise is for the
benefit of A. At least this is true outside of Pennsylvania, where
the distinction there drawn is not enforced.
The tendency of the later cases is unmistakable, the rule as applied to these contracts is buried beneath the exceptions, and the
chief regret now should be that so many courts waver between the
rule and the exceptions. An attempt to resist the current seems to
be a useless waste of energy, because the question is less one of principle than of expediency. Abstractly considered, the case would
stand thus: B. makes, on good consideration, a promise to A. for
the benefit of C., and receives from A. certain assets. These assets
by the gift of A. are, in justice and equity, the property of 0.
The objection to C.'s recovery is not that it will work injustice,
but that it contravenes a rule of law. But that rule was framed
for the protection of the very persons who are here concerned. If
an exception to the rule equally protects their rights, and is in
itself more expedient, why enforce the rule ? The courts seem
now to have reached the point where the expediency of the exceptions is recognised, but, owing to conflicting interests and other
complications, their limits have not been clearly defined. Future
decisions will probably serve to weed out many of the untenable
theories mentioned above, upon which those doctrines are supposed
to be founded, and this once accomplished, the difficulties in the
way of the other task will, in great measure, disappear.
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